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INTRODUCTION
The music business is a cruel and shallow money trench, a
long plastic hallway where thieves and pimps run free, and
good men die like dogs. There’s also a negative side.1
When Steve Jobs, the visionary CEO of Apple, introduced the iTunes
Music Store in 2003, he “demonstrated that the Internet was made for music delivery.”2 But the iTunes Music Store was not revolutionary in the
sense that it provided consumers the ability to download music from the
Internet—services like Napster had been doing it for years.3 Rather, the
Store revolutionized the music industry because it provided users a legal
means of purchasing and downloading music over the Internet.4 That revolution has proven quite lucrative for the technology giant; Apple’s online
sales of digital content exceeded ten billion dollars in 2013.5 However,
while Apple’s online music store was a victory for consumers over the music business’s “cruel and shallow money trench,” perhaps the “negative
side” was that it also created a mutual interest between Internet media distribution services and the music industry in preventing the transfer or resale
of digital media between individual consumers.6
* Samuel Perkins, Juris Doctor Candidate, Class of 2015. I would like to extend
my sincere appreciation to Prof. Yolanda King for her guidance and direction, the Northern
Illinois University Law Review editorial staff for their contributions, and Emily and David
Perkins for their unending support.
1.
Steve Jobs, CEO, Apple Inc., iTunes Keynote Address at Cupertino, Cal. (Apr.
28, 2003, 24:20), http://everystevejobsvideo.com/itunes-music-store-introduction-applespecial-event-2003/ (quoting HUNTER S. THOMPSON, GENERATION OF SWINE: TALES OF
SHAME AND DEGRADATION IN THE ’80’S 43 (New York: Summit Books, 1988)).
2.
See Jobs, supra note 1.
3.
See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 915 (2005); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 444
(1984) (explaining a comprehensive history of Internet piracy); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2001).
4.
See Jobs, supra note 1 (“Why has [piracy] proliferated? Well, because there is
no legal alternative.”).
5.
See
Apple,
Inc.,
Apple
Press
Info
https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/01/07App-Store-Sales-Top-10-Billion-in-2013.html
(last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
6.
See Jobs, supra note 1.
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While Mr. Jobs showed the world that the Internet was made for music
delivery in 2003, consumers quickly realized that the Internet was the perfect conduit for delivering all types of digital media. Consequently, the Internet fundamentally altered the way consumers purchase and use copyrighted works. For example, a decade ago, if you wanted to buy a music
album or a movie, you would go to the record or movie store and purchase
a CD or DVD. You could then play the disk at your home, bring it to a
friend’s house, listen to it in your vehicle, or sell it without ever worrying
about copyright infringement. Today, music and movies are often purchased through online digital marketplaces, such as Apple’s iTunes or Amazon’s CloudPlayer, where they can be downloaded to a phone, tablet, or
laptop.7 These services also allow users to store their digital content in the
cloud instead of on local storage devices such as hard drives or compact
disks.8 In addition, subscription music and video services like Spotify and
Netflix give consumers a new alternative to purchasing media-allowing
subscribers instant access to vast libraries of digital content for a monthly
fee.9 This paradigm shift in media distribution business models—replacing
the physical distribution and sale of CDs and DVDs with digital media
downloads, cloud storage, and subscription services—has made some sections of the Copyright Act ambiguous and difficult to apply to new technologies.
This Comment addresses the legal dichotomies between physical and
digital mediums and concludes by arguing that Section 109 of the Copyright Act, commonly known as the first sale doctrine, should be amended to
address new technologies and market changes in media distribution platforms. Alternatively, courts should apply common law copyright exhaustion principles to resolve the disparate legal treatment between physical and
digital media.10 In the interim, as consumers continue to transition from
physical to digital mediums, the necessity for a digital first sale doctrine in
copyright law will become even more pronounced.
Part I of this Comment provides a background and history of the Copyright Act and related statutes.11 Part II presents three recent cases—Capitol
Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc.,12 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings,

7.
See infra notes 9, 52-56.
8.
See,
e.g.,
Apple,
Inc.,
iCloud:
Content
Everywhere,
http://support.apple.com/kb/ph2587 (last visited Jan. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Apple, iCloud].
9.
See,
e.g.,
Spotify,
Inc.,
All
Your
Music
is
Here,
https://www.spotify.com/us/#features. (last visited Jan. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Spotify, All
Your Music].
10.
17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
11.
See infra Part I, at 3.
12.
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D. N.Y. 2013).
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Inc.,13 and Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.14—in order to illustrate the
struggle courts face when applying existing copyright law to new technologies and formats.15 Part III explains how cloud computing is changing the
way consumers access and acquire digital media, and proposes that Congress re-work some provisions of the Copyright Act to restore the balance
between the competing ownership interests of consumers and copyright
holders.16
Alternatively, Part IV posits that common law copyright exhaustion
principles can and should be used to provide a more straightforward and
cogent approach to analyzing copyright interests in digital media downloads.17 This Part also shows that consumers are negatively impacted when
copyright owners are allowed to exert unchecked control over works after
they enter the stream of commerce.18 Part V surveys the different ways digital media retailers and Internet service providers have addressed piracy
concerns.19 Finally, Part VI concludes by arguing that, as consumers continue to transition to Internet platforms as their primary conduit for purchasing and accessing digital content, the need for a digital first sale doctrine
will become even more apparent.20 Therefore, courts should take advantage
of common law copyright exhaustion principles until adequate changes are
made to the Copyright Act.21

I. THE COPYRIGHT ACT, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT
ACT, AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE.
A.

THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976

The Copyright Act grants certain exclusive rights to the owner of a
copyrighted work, including the right to reproduce, distribute, and publicly
perform the work.22 As codified, copyright protection extends to “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”23 However, these rights are not unlimited. Sections 107 and 109 of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
See infra Part II, at 7.
See infra Part III, at 12.
See infra Part IV, at 19.
See infra Part IV (B), at 20.
See infra Part V, at 23.
See infra Part VI, at 25.
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§101-20 (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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the Act—the fair use and first sale doctrines—place limits on a copyright
holder’s ability to exploit works once they have entered the marketplace.24
The first sale doctrine allows “the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy
or phonorecord.”25 Similarly, the fair use doctrine protects the use of a copyrighted work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” against claims of infringement.26 Together, these two doctrines significantly limit the copyright holder’s control over a work after it has entered the market.27 For example, the first sale doctrine prevents the owner
of a copyrighted work, such as a book, from controlling the sale or distribution of a lawfully made (i.e., not pirated) copy once the particular copy has
been sold in the primary market.28 Thus, once a book is purchased from a
bookstore, the owner of that particular copy is able to sell the book to a
friend, donate it to a library, or sell it to a used bookstore.29 Likewise, the
fair use doctrine functions to limit the copyright owner’s ability to control
the reproduction or distribution of a work when the copied portion is minor
in relation to the whole,30 when the copying is used for education or a noncommercial purpose,31 or when some amount of copying is necessary in
order to provide news, commentary, or criticism of the work.32
B.

THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

In addition to the Copyright Act, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to address technological advancements made
since the Copyright Act was passed in 1976.33 Section 512 of the Act limits
direct liability for copyright infringement for Internet service providers
24.
17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 109 (2012).
25.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3),
the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”).
26.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
27.
See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV.
889, 931 (2011).
28.
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
29.
See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
30.
See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 284 (S.D. N.Y.
2013).
31.
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
32.
See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that parodies are entitled to Fair Use protection because some amount of copying is
necessary in order for the parody to “conjure up” the original in the listener’s mind).
33.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-17, 411, 507, 512 (2012).
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(ISPs), including private cloud-based data-storage companies, through a
safe harbor provision.34 For example, this statutory limitation shields services like Google and Dropbox from liability when individual users upload
illegal copies to their personal accounts.35 On the other hand, Section 1201
of the DMCA makes it illegal to circumvent the anti-piracy measures in
digital media files that prevent the unauthorized copying of protected
works.36 Thus, while Section 106 of the Copyright Act prevents the owner
of a copy from actually making illegal reproductions of the work, Section
1201 of the DMCA makes it illegal for the owner of that copy to bypass the
anti-piracy measures that restrict such copying.37 While these technological
measures, commonly referred to in this Article as Digital Rights Management, have helped to curb Internet piracy through tethering media content
to a physical device or owner, they have also diminished the function of the
first sale doctrine because they prevent the copy owner from selling or
transferring their copy to others.38 Moreover, the DMCA has been criticized
for its inadequacies, especially in the context of cloud-based storage and
computing.39 Although the DMCA helped address piracy concerns from
peer-to-peer file-sharing services such as Napster, Grokster, and Aimster,40
it fails to offer meaningful protection in the context of private, cloud-based
storage platforms.41
C.

THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE

One of the biggest legal issues relating to digital media downloads involves the first sale doctrine.42 Traditionally, the first sale doctrine limited a
copyright holder’s ability to exploit a protected work—such as a movie on a
DVD or a sound recording on a CD—to the initial sale.43 This allowed used
record stores, movie rental companies, and libraries to sell or lend lawfully
made copies of sound recordings and movies.44 The policy considerations
34.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); Anne Datesh, Note, Storms Brewing in the Cloud:
Why Copyright Law Will Have to Adapt to the Future of Web 2.0, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 685, 69495 (2012).
35.
See Datesh, supra note 34, at 694-95.
36.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 902.
37.
See Datesh, supra note 34, at 724.
38.
Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 903.
39.
Id.
40.
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 118 (S.D. N.Y. 2013).
41.
See generally Cullen Kiker, Amazon Cloud Player: The Latest Front in the
Copyright Cold War, 17 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y. 235, 288-89 (2012).
42.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
43.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 250.
44.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 653 (S.D. N.Y.
2013).
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behind the first sale doctrine center on the fact that “[p]hysical copies of
works degrade with time and use, making used copies less desirable than
new ones.”45 Since physical copies of works are restricted by geography
and must be transported for resale, a “natural brake” restricts the volume of
sales in secondary markets.46
The application of the first sale doctrine to copyrighted works “fixed
in any tangible medium of expression,” such as records, CDs, and DVDs, is
relatively straightforward.47 However, the increasing prevalence of digital
media and the ability to download movies and music via the Internet has
created novel legal issues that do not fit well with statutory definitions or
judicial interpretations contemplating only physical mediums.48 Complicating matters further, digital media downloads often subject the purchaser to
lengthy End User License Agreements (EULAs)49 and the digital content
itself may contain Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology that restricts the user’s control over the media.50 Finally, the popularization of
subscription music services such as Spotify,51 iTunes Radio,52 and Pandora,53 as well as subscription video services like Netflix,54 Redbox,55 and
Amazon Prime56 have fundamentally altered the traditional media distribution business model.57 In fact, subscription services like Spotify are likely
45.
See U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Cong., DMCA Section 104 Report, at 8283 (2001), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol1.pdf [hereinafter DMCA Report].
46.
DMCA Report, supra note 45.
47.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 250.
48.
See Nakimuli Davis, Reselling Digital Music: Is There a Digital First Sale
Doctrine? 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 363, 364 (2009).
49.
See, e.g., Apple, Inc., Legal: Licensed Application End User License Agreement, https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/ (last visited
Jan. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Apple, User License Agreement] (“This license granted to You for
the Licensed Application by Application Provider is limited to a non-transferable license . . .
.”).
50.
See Davis, supra note 48, at 368.
51.
See Spotify, All Your Music, supra note 9.
52.
See Apple, Inc., iTunes Radio: Hear Where Music Takes You,
http://www.apple.com/itunes/itunes-radio/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
53.
See Pandora Media, Inc., About, http://www.pandora.com/about (last visited
Jan. 5, 2014).
54.
See
Netflix,
Inc.,
Netflix
Help
Center,
https://help.netflix.com/article/en/node/en/node/412 (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
55.
See
Redbox
Automated
Retail,
L.L.C.,
Media
Center,
http://www.redbox.com/facts (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
56.
See
Amazon.com,
Inc.,
Amazon
Prime,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00DBYBNEE/ref=gno_joinprmlogo (last visited Jan.
5, 2014).
57.
See Ed Christman, Digital Music Sales Decrease For First Time in 2013,
BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/5855162/digital-
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responsible for the first decline in digital music sales since the inception of
iTunes in 2001.58 In order to understand how the first sale doctrine operates
to limit a copyright holder’s control over a work once it has entered the
stream of commerce, it is necessary to examine how courts have construed
the Copyright Act’s fixation requirement, the reproduction right, and the
distribution right.

II. CASES DEALING WITH THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
A.

THE REPRODUCTION RIGHT: CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC V.
REDIGI, INC.

ReDigi launched its “online marketplace for digital used music” on
October 13, 2011, offering users the ability to buy and sell digital music
previously purchased from iTunes.59 Essentially, ReDigi offered an online
market analogous to a used record store.60 After the user downloads ReDigi’s “Media Manager,” the program searches the computer hard drive for
media eligible for sale on ReDigi’s website.61 Once the scan is complete,
the user is presented with a list of files—iTunes downloads and music purchased from ReDigi—that are eligible for sale.62 If a user decides to sell a
music file, the Media Manager software uploads the copy to ReDigi’s servers and simultaneously deletes the file from the user’s computer.63 Thereafter, the software continuously runs in the background to ensure the user has
not retained music that has already been sold or uploaded for sale.64
Once users upload a file to ReDigi’s “Cloud Locker” server, they have
the option either to store the file in the “Cloud Locker” for streaming and
personal use, or place the music file in ReDigi’s digital marketplace for
sale.65 ReDigi characterizes the upload process as a piece-by-piece migration of the file “analogous to a train” running from the user’s computer to
ReDigi’s servers, so that the file never exists in more than one place at a
time.66 In contrast, Capitol Records insists that ReDigi’s upload process,
music-sales-decrease-for-first-time-in-2013 (last visited Jan. 5, 2014) (attributing the decline
in digital music sales to the increasing popularity of streaming music services).
58.
Id.
59.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (S.D. N.Y.
2013).
60.
Id.
61.
ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (S.D. N.Y.
2013).
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transferring a file from the user’s computer to ReDigi’s servers, “necessarily involves copying.”67 ReDigi earns a sixty percent commission on every
sale, while the seller retains twenty percent of the sale price and an additional twenty percent is held in an escrow account for royalty payments for
the artist.68
To determine whether ReDigi violated Capitol’s reproduction or distribution rights, the court first looked to Section 106 of the Copyright Act.69
Since the reproduction right of copyright owners defines sound recordings
as “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or
other sounds,” the protected work is distinct from the material object it is
fixed in.70 Thus, the reproduction right is implicated once the owner of a
particular copy embodies the copyright holder’s work in a material object.71
Since, by their very nature, digital music files must be embodied in a new
material object (i.e., a hard drive) after they are transferred over the Internet, the transfer implicates the copyright owner’s exclusive reproduction
right under the Copyright Act.72
Rejecting ReDigi’s “train” analogy, the court held that ReDigi infringed Capitol’s reproduction right, even if the original file was deleted
simultaneously, because the file transfer (from the user’s computer to ReDigi’s servers) fixed the copy in a new material object.73 Although the court
acknowledged that the application of the first sale doctrine to digital media
files was necessarily limited, it noted that Section 109(a) still allowed for
the owner of a particular phonorecord to sell the device onto which the file
was originally downloaded, such as a hard drive, mp3 player, or iPod.74
67.
Id. at 646.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
70.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 646; H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476 at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669 (“The copyrightable work comprises the aggregation of sounds and not the tangible medium of fixation. Thus, ‘sound recordings’ as copyrightable subject matter are distinguished from ‘phonorecords,’ the latter being physical
objects in which sounds are fixed.”).
71.
DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.02 (1965).
72.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
73.
Id. The court noted that:
ReDigi’s argument fails for two reasons. First, while technological change may have rendered Section 109(a) unsatisfactory to many contemporary observers and consumers, it has not
rendered it ambiguous. The statute plainly applies to the lawful
owner’s ‘particular’ phonorecord, a phonorecord that by definition cannot be uploaded and sold on ReDigi’s website. Second, amendment of the Copyright Act in line with ReDigi’s
proposal is a legislative prerogative that courts are unauthorized and ill suited to attempt.
Id.
74.
Id.
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Yet, such a limited reading of the first sale doctrine usurps the longstanding balance of rights between consumers and copyright holders.
B.

THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT: CARTOON NETWORK LP V.
CSC HOLDINGS, INC.

In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the Second Circuit was
tasked with determining what constituted a fixation in a material object as
defined by the Copyright Act.75 In that case, CSC Holdings (Cablevision), a
cable television operator, released a new Remote Storage Digital Video
Recorder (RS-DVR), allowing its customers to record cable programming
on Cablevision’s remote servers without purchasing a standalone DVR device.76
Cablevision’s RS-DVR system works by intercepting live feeds sent
from content providers to cable companies and splitting the feed into two
streams.77 The first data stream is relayed directly to customers as expected.78 However, the second data stream is routed into a Broadband Media Router (BMR) where the video stream is buffered and reformatted before being sent to high-capacity hard drives.79 If an RS-DVR customer requests a particular program, the stream will move from a buffer to a hard
drive on Cablevision’s remote servers.80 Old data is erased from the buffer
as new data enters so that the buffer holds no more than 1.2 seconds of television programming at a time.81 The process is similar to traditional DVRs
in the sense that customers use a remote control to record programming in
advance, but may not record an earlier portion of a program that has already
begun.82 According to the court, the main difference between traditional
DVRs and Cablevisions RS-DVR is that:
[I]nstead of sending signals from the remote to an
on-set box, the viewer sends signals from the remote, through the cable, to [Cablevision’s] Server
at [their] central facility. In this respect, RS-DVR
75.
See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.
2008).
76.
See id. “RS-DVR customers may then receive playback of those programs
through their home television sets, using only a remote control and a standard cable box
equipped with the RS-DVR software.” Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 125.
81.
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2008).
82.

Id.
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more closely resembles a [Video On-Demand] service, whereby a cable subscriber uses his remote
and cable box to request transmission of content,
such as a movie, stored on computers at the cable
company’s facility. But unlike a [Video OnDemand] service, RS-DVR users can only play
content that they previously requested to be recorded.83
To address the issue of whether Cablevision’s buffering of the feeds
contain copyrighted works “reproduced” the work “in copies” within the
meaning of Section 106(1) of the Copyright Act, the court first looked to
the definitions of copies and fixed.84 According to the court, section 101 of
the Act imposes two distinct, but related requirements: the work must be
embodied in a medium (the embodiment requirement),85 and it must remain
embodied in the medium for a period of more than transitory duration (the
duration requirement).86 Thus, “[u]nless both requirements are met, the
work is not ‘fixed’ in the buffer, and, as a result, the buffer data is not a
‘copy’ of the original work whose data is buffered.”87
Finally, the court looked to the Copyright Office’s 2001 DMCA Report to determine when a copy is fixed within the meaning of the Copyright
Act, but criticized the Report for reading the “transitory duration” language
out of the statute.88 The court held that because the copyrighted works were
not embodied in the buffers for a period of more than transitory duration,
they were not ‘fixed’ within the meaning of Section 101 of the Act.89 Since,
by definition, a copy must be fixed in a material object, Cablevision’s services did not create copies within the meaning of the Act.90

83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 127. “‘Copies’ are material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any
method . . . and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)
(“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its . . . embodiment is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be reproduced for a period of more than transitory
duration.”).
85.
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 127.
86.
Id. at 125.
87.
Id. at 127.
88.
See id.; DMCA Report, supra note 45, at 111 (a work is fixed “[u]nless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or communicated . . .
.”).
89.
Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130.
90.
Id.
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THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT: KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY &
SONS, INC.

In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court extended
the first sale doctrine to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made
abroad.91 In that case, John Wiley, a publisher of academic books, sued
Supap Kirtsaeng, a college student from Thailand, after Kirtsaeng sold foreign editions of textbooks in the United States.92 Wiley claimed that
Kirtsaeng infringed its section 106(3) exclusive distribution right when he
imported the textbooks and sold them without Wiley’s permission.93
Kirtsaeng argued that he did not need Wiley’s permission to sell the books
because section 109(a) permitted him to resell the “lawfully made” books
without the permission of the copyright holder.94 Thus, the Supreme Court
was tasked with deciding whether the words “lawfully made under this title” impose a geographical limitation on section 109(a)-the first sale doctrine.95
First, the Court looked to the text of section 109(a) and concluded that
the most logical interpretation of the language favored a nongeographical
interpretation.96 According to the majority view, “lawfully made” distinguishes copies that were made lawfully from those that were made illegally,
and “under this title” is used to set forth or define the standard of lawfulness.97 On the other hand, Wiley’s interpretation of the words “lawfully
made” would deprive the words of significance.98 Moreover, “neither ‘under’ nor any other word in the phrase means ‘where.’”99 Thus, the Court
concluded that a geographical interpretation would create more linguistic
problems than it would solve.100
Next, the Court looked to the history and context of the first sale doctrine for support of a geographical restriction.101 Specifically, the Court
compared the language of section 109(a) with its immediate predecessor

91.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013).
92.
Id. at 1356.
93.
Id. at 1357.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 1358.
96.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013) (“[T]he
nongeographical reading is simple, it promotes a traditional copyright objective (combatting
piracy), and makes word-by-word linguistic sense.”).
97.
Id.
98.
Id. (the Court asked: “How could a book be un lawfully ‘made under this title’?”).
99.
Id. at 1359.
100.
Id. at 1360.
101.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1360 (2013).
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under the 1909 Copyright Act.102 Under the previous version, the Act read,
“Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been
lawfully obtained.”103 Under the current version of the Act, the statute
reads, “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title is entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord.”104 The Court reasoned that the change in language
was meant to limit the scope of the first sale doctrine to owners of a particular copy, as opposed to lawful possessors of a copy.105 Thus, the legislative
history behind Section 109(a) clearly favored a non-geographical interpretation.106
Finally, the Court looked at how imposing a geographical restriction
on Section 109(a) would undermine basic objectives of the Copyright
Act.107 First, the Court noted that libraries contain millions of books published abroad, and imposing a geographical interpretation would “likely
require the libraries to obtain permission (or at least create significant uncertainty) before circulating or otherwise distributing these books.”108 Similarly, used-book dealers rely on the assumption that the first sale doctrine
applies to books printed and published abroad.109 Reading a geographical
restriction into section 109(a) would injure a large portion of the used-book
business and create uncertainty for books made outside the United States.110
Moreover, a geographical interpretation of section 109(a) would create difficulties for companies who manufacture products such as automobiles
abroad and then import the products into the United States.111 For example,
such interpretation would prevent the resale of a foreign vehicle without
first obtaining the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece
of copyrighted automobile software.112 Thus, the Court rejected a geographical interpretation of section 109(a), reasoning that “the practical problems .
. . are too serious, extensive, and likely to come about . . . particularly in
light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America.”113

102.
See Copyright Act of 1909, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (1997) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012)).
103.
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1360.
104.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006)).
105.
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1360.
106.
Id. at 1361.
107.
Id. at 1362.
108.
Id. at 1364.
109.
Id.
110.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1364 (2013).
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 1367.
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III. CURRENT PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
DIGITAL FIRST SALE DILEMMA
A.

THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT LOSES RELEVANCE IN THE
CLOUD

Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines “copies” as material objects
in which a work is fixed by any method, and from which the work can be
reproduced.114 “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration.”115
In ReDigi, the court relied on these definitions, reasoning that because
the transfer of a digital file over the Internet requires a new copy to be created on the recipient’s hard drive, the reproduction right is implicated even
when the original file is simultaneously deleted.116 However, the ReDigi
decision effectively read the duration requirement out of the statute.117 Because the copies only existed for a brief moment (during the transfer from
the user’s computer to ReDigi’s servers), they were not “sufficiently permanent or stable”118 and incapable of being reproduced “for a period of
more than transitory duration.”119 Thus, the ReDigi court should have concluded that the reproductions were not fixed, and therefore not copies within the meaning of the Act.120 This interpretation is also compatible with the
holding in Cartoon Network, which criticized the district court’s decision
for reading the durational requirement out of the statute.121 These cases illustrate the difficulty courts face in applying copyright principles to digital

114.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
115.
Id.
116.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D. N.Y.
2013).
117.
See id.
118.
Compare MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a computer program stored in the computer’s temporary memory
(RAM) was capable of being perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated) with Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the
MAI Systems court did not correctly analyze the duration requirement).
119.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
120.
See id.
121.
See id.
The district court mistakenly limited its analysis primarily to the embodiment requirement.
As a result of this error, once it determined that the buffer data was “[c]learly . . . capable of
being reproduced,” i.e., that the work was embodied in the buffer, the district court concluded that the work was therefore “fixed” in the buffer, and that a copy had thus been made.
Id.
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media downloads.122 Unfortunately, the arduous fixation analysis becomes
even more convoluted when applied to cloud-based distribution platforms
for digital media.123
The advent of cloud storage and computing is fundamentally altering
the way consumers buy, store, and access digital media.124 Digital music
distributors such as Apple’s iTunes Store or Amazon’s CloudPlayer allow
users to purchase digital media and store it on the distributor’s servers.125
This allows customers to access the same media file on multiple devices,
download the file, or stream it.126 The emergence of cloud-based platforms
has also created an alternative to purchasing media, and a growing number
of consumers are transitioning to paid subscription-based streaming services like Netflix and Spotify.127 Essentially, these services create a limited
license for subscribers to reproduce a copyrighted work on any device associated with their account.128 The shift in the digital marketplace—from purchasing and downloading media files onto local storage devices to purchasing and storing content using cloud storage—presents an interesting question: What happens when you purchase, but do not download, a song from
iTunes or Amazon?129
In ReDigi, the court stated that “a ReDigi user owns the phonorecord
that was created when she purchased and downloaded a song from iTunes
to her hard disk.”130 Thus, since a copy must necessarily be downloaded
before it is created, an iTunes user who purchases a song without downloading it should be able to sell his or her access to the song (via their account information131) without violating the reproduction right.132 While the
iTunes EULA prohibits sharing or transferring personal accounts,133 the
hypothetical raises serious questions about the applicability of existing copyright law to digital media.134 Specifically, the fixation requirement,135 requiring a work to be fixed in a tangible medium (i.e., a computer hard
122.
See generally ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d 640; Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121.
123.
See generally ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 655; Kiker, supra note 41, at 239-40.
124.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 239-40.
125.
See Datesh, supra note 34, at 694.
126.
See, e.g., Apple, iCloud, supra note 8.
127.
See Christman, supra note 57 (attributing the decline in digital music sales to
the increasing popularity of streaming music services).
128.
See, e.g., Apple, iCloud, supra note 8.
129.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 282.
130.
Capitol Records, LLC v, ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D. N.Y.
2013) (emphasis added).
131.
See, e.g., Apple, iCloud, supra note 8.
132.
See id.
133.
See generally Apple, User License Agreement, supra note 49.
134.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 902.
135.
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2008).
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drive) for a period of more than transitory duration, is ill-suited for cloud
storage applications because the fixation initially occurs on the distributor’s
server, not the user’s hard drive.136 Since “actual dissemination of a
copy”137 is a prerequisite for infringement of the distribution right, copy
owners who resell their media that is stored in the cloud may be able to
avoid liability for copyright infringement because the copy has not changed
hands;138 rather, it remains on the cloud server.139 Additionally, files stored
on hard disks regularly move to different locations on the same disk, to
different disks on the same server, or even between servers.140 Thus, until
the Copyright Act is amended, courts will continue to struggle with the
application of existing copyright law to new technologies and platforms and
services.141
B.

A MORE WORKABLE APPROACH: AVOIDING TECHNICAL
ANALOGIES TO PHYSICAL MEDIA DISTRIBUTION MODELS

The ReDigi court took a very technical approach in defining ReDigi’s
digital marketplace.142 In ReDigi, the court relied on the fact that a new
copy of the music file must be created on the recipient’s hard drive when an
Internet transfer takes place in holding that the service infringed the copyright holder’s reproduction right.143 However, the practical effect of the
service was more akin to ReDigi’s “train” analogy; transferring a copy over
the Internet so that the data does not exist in two places at any one time.144
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s decision in Cartoon Network suggests that
136.

Id.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.

137.
See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007); 17
U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
138.
See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984 (D. Ariz. 2008).
139.
Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1106 (C.D.
Cal. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067 (9th
Cir. 2013).
140.
See Eurie Hayes Smith IV, Digital First Sale: Friend or Foe? 22 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 853, 856 (2005); Kiker, supra note 41, at 289 (providing a more detailed
description on hard drives).
141.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 281-82.
142.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 653 (S.D. N.Y.
2013); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
143.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
144.
Id. at 645.
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a transfer of a media file over the Internet does not necessarily involve copying, especially when the copy is not fixed for more than a transitory duration.145 The common problem in ReDigi and Cartoon Network is that section 101’s fixation requirement was designed for an era that used physical
media.146 In the age of digital media downloads and cloud storage services,
it is better to think of content as fixed to a user’s account,147 not in a material object such as a CD or DVD.148 The fixation requirement as currently
interpreted creates a significant obstacle for owners of digital media to sell,
transfer, or otherwise alienate their digital media libraries.149
Instead of defining the material object as a user’s hard drive, courts
should interpret the fixation requirement in relation to the user’s account.150
Under this approach, a work would be fixed in a material object (the user’s
account or digital library) when a customer purchases media from an online
marketplace such as Apple’s iTunes or Amazon’s CloudPlayer.151 Thus, a
user would be free to stream, download, and access all media purchased
under his or her account without violating the copyright holder’s reproduction or distribution right.152 However, users would not be able to access
content that they have not purchased under that particular account.153 This
approach closely mirrors the industry practice; Apple and Amazon already
offer these services, avoiding copyright barriers by contracting with record
labels and production companies and attempting to license, rather than sell

145.
See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 129 (“In sum, no case law or other authority
dissuades us from concluding that the definition of ‘fixed’ imposes both an embodiment
requirement and a duration requirement.”).
146.
See Sarah Abelson, Comment, An Emerging Secondary Market for Digital
Music, 29 ENT. & SPORTS L. 8, 10 (Winter 2012).
147.
See, e.g., Apple, iCloud, supra note 8.
148.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 653; Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123.
149.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 649. The court notes that:
Because the reproduction right is necessarily implicated when
a copyrighted work is embodied in a new material object, and
because digital music files must be embodied in a new material object following their transfer over the Internet, the Court
determines that the embodiment of a digital music file on a
new hard disk is a reproduction within the meaning of the
Copyright Act.
Id.
150.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 943.
151.
See id. (noting that DRM technologies already tie user-accounts to protected
media files).
152.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 244; see also Datesh, supra note 34, at 703-04
(noting that cloud storage creates legal ambiguities and enforcement problems under the
DMCA).
153.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 943 (noting that DRM technologies
already tie user-accounts to protected media files).
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digital media.154 In fact, consumer preference for subscription music services like Spotify, which give subscribers access to a vast library of digital
music for a fixed monthly fee, are thought to be responsible for the first
ever decline in digital music sales since Apple’s iTunes opened in 2001.155
Although defining the fixation requirement in terms of a user account
would provide consumers with legal certainty and greater personal control
over their purchased content,156 without a digital first sale doctrine consumers would still be unable to sell or transfer their purchased media content to
others.157
C.

§117 & COMPUTER PROGRAMS—A ROADMAP FOR
CREATING A DIGITAL FIRST SALE DOCTRINE

If Congress ever considers incorporating a digital first sale limitation
into the Copyright Act, section 117 would provide them with an ideal template for doing so.158 Section 117 of the Copyright Act was first introduced
in 1980 to extend limited copyright protection to computer programs.159
The current version of the statute places limitations on the exclusive rights
of copyright holders in computer programs, allowing copy owners to make
copies of, and alterations to, the original program when it is necessary for
the use, backup, or repair of the program.160 Additionally, section 117 con-

154.
See Apple, User License Agreement, supra note 49 (“This license granted to
You for the Licensed Application by Application Provider is limited to a non-transferable
license . . . .”).
155.
See Christman, supra note 57 (attributing the decline in digital music sales to
the increasing popularity of streaming music services).
156.
See, e.g., Apple, iCloud, supra note 8.
157.
See, e.g., Apple, User License Agreement, supra note 49 (“This license granted
to You for the Licensed Application by Application Provider is limited to a non-transferable
license . . . .”). Although companies such as Apple continue to allow users greater access and
flexibility to their purchased digital content, these rights only pertain only to personal use.
Thus, without a digital first sale doctrine, users are still prevented from transferring or reselling their digital media libraries to others.
158.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).
159.
Id.
160.
17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012) states:
Making of additional copy or adaptation by owner of copy.-Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of
that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of
the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that
it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival cop-
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tains a corollary to the first sale doctrine of section 109, allowing the owner
of a copy to sell, lease, or transfer their copy of the program.161 The rationale behind allowing copy holders of computer programs to make copies
and adaptions of the work stems from the fact that computer programs may
need to be reproduced in order to be used as intended.162 Moreover, many
computer programs must be adapted or modified in order to function with
the user’s hardware and software configuration.163 Copies are also necessary to the user because computer programs are inherently susceptible to
accidental deletion or corruption, and often must be re-installed when upgrading components and software.164
Many of the justifications mentioned above for allowing the copying
and resale of computer programs also apply to digital media. For example,
computer programs and digital media files must both be reproduced in a
computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM) in order to be used.165 Also,
both computer programs and digital media files are capable of degradation,
accidental deletion, and corruption.166 Digital movie files, just like computer programs, must be modified and converted to different formats and resolutions depending on the screen or device they are being played on.167 The
same is true for digital music files; in fact, Apple’s iTunes software allows
users to convert music files between multiple formats of varying quality
and size.168 The statutory definition of a computer program—“a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result”—is so overbroad as to encompass not

Id.

Id.

ies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful.
161.

17 U.S.C. § 117(b) (2012) states:
Lease, sale, or other transfer of additional copy or adaptation.-Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions
of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred,
along with the copy from which such copies were prepared,
only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in
the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only
with the authorization of the copyright owner.

162.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 935.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 936; see also MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
517 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a computer program stored in the computer’s temporary
memory (“RAM”) was capable of being perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated).
166.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 935.
167.
Id.
168.
See Apple, User License Agreement, supra note 49.
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only digital media, but also nearly every file on a computer.169 The striking
functional similarities between computer programs and digital media calls
into question the disparate treatment afforded to each under existing copyright law. Regardless, section 117 provides an excellent template for Congress to amend the first sale doctrine to include digital works.170
D.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Fixing a customer’s digital media to their account, instead of to their
hard drive, also presents issues of statutory interpretation. First, a user account is not a “material object” contemplated by section 101 of the Copyright Act.171 Rather, a user account is like a key or passcode that grants a
user access to purchased content residing on remote servers.172 Thus, the
requirement that a copy be fixed in a material object presents a significant
hurdle to the proposed approach.173 Second, section 101 of the Act defines
copies as material objects “from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”174 A CD player is an example of a machine or device used
to reproduce a copy.175 However, is the Internet a “machine or device”
within the meaning of the Act? If a copy is fixed in a cloud server after a
user purchases a song from iTunes, technically the user should be able to
sell his or her access to the file without ever making an illegal reproduction.176 Thus, infringement would lie with the subsequent purchaser, not
with the seller.177 Third, is a media file protected with DRM or a comparable technology capable of being “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated” if it can only be accessed by the original purchaser, and
how does the transition to the cloud affect the interests of copyright owners?178 Finally, even if a digital media file is fixed in a user’s account instead of a local hard drive, the current copyright statutes and case law
169.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
170.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).
171.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
172.
See Apple, Inc., My Apple ID, https://appleid.apple.com (last visited Jan. 5,
2014) [hereinafter Apple, Apple ID].
173.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
174.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
175.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 896.
176.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘device,’ ‘machine,’ or ‘process’ is one now known
or later developed.”); see also Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640,
650 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) (“[I]t is the creation of a new material object and not an additional
material object that defines the reproduction right.”).
177.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
178.
See Datesh, supra note 34, at 702 (noting that the transition to cloud-based
storage has exposed many weaknesses in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, making “its
application in the cloud . . . untenable.”).
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would provide little guidance on the legality of selling or transferring these
media files to others, and digital media distributors like Apple and Amazon
do not allow transfers from one account to another.179

IV. COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO
THE FIRST SALE DILEMMA
A.

APPLYING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE TO DIGITAL MEDIA
DOWNLOADS

In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley, the Supreme Court held that copies of
textbooks lawfully manufactured abroad were protected by the first sale
doctrine.180 In that case, the Court emphasized that “[the Court] doubt[ed]
that Congress would have intended to create the practical copyright-related
harms with which a geographical interpretation would threaten ordinary
scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer activities.”181 This reasoning
should also be imported to first sale defenses to copyright infringement for
digital media content. Just as a geographical interpretation would substantially limit the rights of libraries and used-book retailers,182 a technical interpretation of fixation and reproduction, like in ReDigi, creates practical
copyright-related harms to digital media consumers.183
Without a digital first sale doctrine, a CD can be resold indefinitely,
but a digital download of the same album can only be resold if the computer
or device is sold along with it.184 The flaw in this approach to digital media
is apparent when the analogy is reversed—it would be tantamount to requiring one to sell his or her CD player or stereo along with the CD.185 Although the United States Copyright Office expressed concerns with a digital
first sale doctrine in its Digital Millennium Copyright Act Report, its hesitancy to adopt a digital first sale doctrine should not be equated with complete disapproval.186 The “practical copyright-related harms” of a geograph179.
See Apple, User License Agreement, supra note 49 (“This license granted to
You for the Licensed Application by Application Provider is limited to a non-transferable
license . . . .”).
180.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013).
181.
Id. at 1358.
182.
Id. at 1354.
183.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D. N.Y.
2013).
184.
See id. at 656 (“Section 109(a) still protects a lawful owner’s sale of her ‘particular’ phonorecord, be it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the
file was originally downloaded.” Id.).
185.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
186.
See DMCA Report, supra note 45, at 82-83; see also Kiker, supra note 41, at
252 (noting that “[e]ven though some courts have been skeptical to provide protection to
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ical restriction to the first sale doctrine are equally harmful when applied to
medium restrictions for digital media resale.187 As consumers continue to
adopt digital mediums as the primary method of purchasing content, the
need for a digital first sale doctrine will become even more pronounced.188
B.

COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
TO A DIGITAL FIRST SALE DOCTRINE

A corollary to the first sale doctrine is the principle of copyright exhaustion. This principle is premised on the idea that “a fundamental set of
user rights or privileges flows from lawful ownership of a copy of a
work.”189 Although copyright exhaustion is a common law principle not
codified in the Copyright Act, the fair use and first sale doctrines originated
from the broader exhaustion concept.190 According to Professor Perzanowski, courts should adopt a copyright exhaustion rule that enables copy owners “to reproduce or prepare derivative works based on that copy to the extent necessary to enable the use, preservation, or alienation of that particular
copy or any lawful reproduction of it.”191 Thus, a copyright exhaustion rule,
in conjunction with the first sale doctrine, would give users of digital media
functionally similar rights to those enjoyed by users of traditional physical
mediums.192 This alternative approach provides functionally similar rights
to the fixation in a user account approach outlined in Part III (B), supra.193
Using the common law copyright exhaustion principle, together with
the first sale doctrine, the analysis in ReDigi would be much simpler and
straightforward.194 First, a court would determine if the user owned the particular media file. If so, the court would determine whether the reproduction
of the file was used to facilitate the transfer of the user’s limited ownership
interest.195 If the user does not retain any copies of the file once a transfer is
completed, copyright exhaustion should protect the transfer.196 Since the
end result of a transfer requires that only a single copy exist before and after
technologies that are neutral yet allow piracy, some courts have not been hesitant to protect
services that provide a service that is equivalent to a known legal service.”).
187.
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358.
188.
See Christman, supra note 57 (attributing the decline in digital music sales to
the increasing popularity of streaming music services).
189.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 912.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
See supra Part III (B).
194.
See generally Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656
(S.D. N.Y. 2013).
195.
See generally Perzanowski et al., supra note 27.
196.
See id. at 939.
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the transaction, the temporary copies discussed in ReDigi would be irrelevant.197 Rather, this approach is comparable to Cablevision’s “train” analogy.198 Overall, copyright exhaustion offers a more flexible and balanced
approach than the ad hoc application of the fair use or first sale doctrines on
their own.199 Additionally, the increased clarity and easy application that
common law copyright exhaustion offers would benefit consumers and
copyright owners alike, by reducing the frequency of costly and timeconsuming litigation.200
C.

COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
WOULD PROMOTE INNOVATION AND MARKET
COMPETITION

Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments for limiting copyright
holders’ control over works once they enter the stream of commerce is the
positive effect on marketplace innovation and competition.201 For example,
because the first sale doctrine applies to physical copies such as DVDs,
movie rental companies such as Netflix and Redbox are able to distribute
purchased copies of movies to subscribers without the permission of the
copyright holders.202 The importance of this right was recently highlighted
when the Disney movie studio tried to implement rental windows—a delay
between the time a DVD goes on sale at retail stores and when the same
disk is offered to rental companies.203 When Netflix and Disney could not
reach an agreement regarding the rental windows, the first sale doctrine
allowed Netflix to purchase newly released copies from retailers such as
Wal-Mart for a slightly higher price in order to make the DVDs available to
subscribers without the rental window delay.204 Without common law and
statutory limitations on works once they enter the stream of commerce,
copyright holders would have excessive control over their works, leaving
consumers with fewer choices and reducing competition.205
While the first sale doctrine promotes market efficiency and competition for physical copies of media, digital media distributors such as Apple’s
iTunes continue to stifle innovation and consumer choice through monopo197.
See id. at 912; ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
198.
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 657.
199.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 892.
200.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 269.
201.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 898.
202.
See Trefis Team, Netflix and Disney Butt Heads Over the DVD Rental Window,
FORBES.COM, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/06/11/netflix-and-disneybutt-heads-over-the-dvd-rental-window/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 898.
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lization and consumer lock-in.206 Consumer lock-in refers to the high transaction cost consumers face when attempting to switch to a new, more advantageous service or platform.207 When distributors restrict the compatibility and use of media so that it may only be used with a particular service,
consumers are discouraged from switching to newer alternatives, even if
they offer a better product or service.208 Thus, consumer lock-in deprives
consumers of meaningful alternatives and creates a windfall for distributors,
who enjoy the monopolistic and anti-competitive effects that such restrictions create.209
For example, Apple’s iBooks store initially restricted eBook sales to
iPad users.210 Because consumers who purchased eBooks through Apple’s
iBook store could only access the texts on their iPads, consumers were discouraged from purchasing newer tablets or eReaders such as Amazon’s
Kindle or Barnes & Noble’s Nook.211 Furthermore, because the first sale
doctrine does not apply to eBooks, consumers are unable to sell or lend
their digital copies.212 Eventually, the United States Department of Justice
filed suit against Apple and five major book publishers under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, alleging that Apple and the publishers colluded to fix prices
in the eBook market.213 Thus, the fact remains that until a first sale doctrine
is imported to limit copyright owners’ control over digital works already in
the stream of commerce, consumers will have fewer options and continue to
pay higher premiums for content that would otherwise be readily available
and affordable through a secondary market.214 Meanwhile, digital media
distributors like Apple will continue to monopolize the digital media marketplace, stifling innovation and competition.215 While piracy concerns provided justification for this disparate treatment in the past, new legal remedies under the DMCA and advances in DRM anti-piracy technologies have
obviated the need for such distinctions.216

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 900.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 671, 676 (S.D. N.Y. 2012).
Id.
See supra Part III (A).
See In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d at 676.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 891.
Id. at 895.
See DMCA Report, supra note 45, at 82-83.
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V. DRM TECHNOLOGY AND PIRACY CONCERNS
A.

CURRENT ANTI-PIRACY SOLUTIONS SUFFICIENTLY
PROTECT COPYRIGHT INTERESTS IN DIGITAL WORKS

Traditionally, both Congress and the courts have been hesitant to expand consumer rights in digital assets due to piracy concerns.217 However,
Digital Rights Management (DRM) and other anti-piracy measures currently used in the industry largely protect copyrighted works from piracy.218
DRM is an anti-piracy technology that encrypts digital files and restricts the
distribution and use of the media.219 A popular type of DRM technology,
known as tethering, links a protected work (i.e., an eBook) to a device or
user account.220 In addition, the DMCA prohibits users from circumventing
technological measures that restrict access to and copying of copyrighted
works, as well as prohibiting the creation and distribution of tools that facilitate circumvention.221 Although current DRM and related technologies
present obstacles to a digital first sale doctrine by tethering files to a specific device, its use has significantly curtailed piracy.222 Moreover, the concerns expressed in ReDigi over the differences between physical and digital
mediums are less pronounced when DRM tethers a copyrighted work to a
particular device because tethering effectively creates the same barriers as a

217.
See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th
Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 915 (2005);
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 444 (1984) for a comprehensive history of Internet piracy.
218.
See Hayes Smith, supra note 140, at 856.
219.
Id.
220.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 903-04.
221.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103, 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)-(b) (2012).
222.
See DMCA Report, supra note 45, at 75-76, noting that:
A plausible argument can be made that section 1201 may have
a negative effect on the operation of the first sale doctrine in
the context of works tethered to a particular device. In the case
of tethered works, even if the work is on removable media, the
content cannot be accessed on any device other than the one
on which it was originally made. This process effectively prevents disposition of the work. However, the practice of tethering a copy of a work to a particular hardware device does not
appear to be widespread at this time, at least outside the context of electronic books . . . . Should this practice become
widespread, it could have serious consequences for the operation of the first sale doctrine, although the ultimate effect on
consumers is unclear.
Id.
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physical copy.223 Similarly, piracy concerns are adequately addressed by
DRM technology because it can prevent playback of a digital media file in
the event of an unauthorized transfer.224
Since DRM technology has advanced significantly and offers protection against piracy of copyrighted works, a digital first sale doctrine is now
feasible and would not encourage piracy.225 Although DRM currently presents an obstacle to a digital first sale doctrine, it could easily be adapted to
facilitate the resale and transfer of digital media in a controlled and legal
manner.226 However, in order for the first sale doctrine to apply, courts
would have to consider user accounts to be material objects, an idea that is
hard to reconcile with the tangible nature of copies contemplated by the
Act’s fixation requirement.227 Also, courts would have to decide if a digital
download purchase is classified as ownership of the copy or a license to use
the copy.228 Finally, existing cloud storage platforms like Apple’s iTunes or
Amazon’s CloudPlayer that link content to a user account would have to
amend their End User License Agreements and DRM technology to allow
users to sell or transfer their digital media to other users.229

223.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D. N.Y.
2013) (citing DMCA Report, supra note 45, at 82-83 (“Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to the movement of copies, since digital copies can be transmitted nearly
instantaneously nearly anywhere in the world with minimal effort and negligible cost.”)).
But see Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 905 (noting that tethering a digital work to a
device through DRM technology effectively alleviates this concern).
224.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 903-04 (“Many of these systems are
tethered not just to particular devices but also to particular services, allowing copyright
holders control over post sale consumer uses by requiring access to these services for the
enjoyment of the purchased good.”).
225.
Id. at 904.
226.
See id.
227.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
“Copies” are material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by
any method . . . and from which the work can be . . . reproduced . . . . A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of
more than transitory duration.
Id.
228.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 249-50. The issue of sale vs. license is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
229.
See Apple, User License Agreement, supra note 49 (“This license granted to
You for the Licensed Application by Application Provider is limited to a non-transferable
license . . . .”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As consumers continue to adopt online digital media services as the
primary method of purchasing media content, the necessity for a digital first
sale or copyright exhaustion doctrine will become even more pronounced.
Although media distributors and the film and recording industries have
benefited from a windfall due to the lack of a digital first sale doctrine, recent studies have shown that consumers are beginning to look for alternatives to traditional media retailers and distributors.230 Previously, the courts
and legislatures were able to justify differentiating between physical and
digital mediums due to the proliferation of Internet piracy.231 However, the
times are changing, and digital media distribution platforms have adopted
new technologies to significantly curb piracy, making a digital first sale
doctrine attainable.232
Regardless, the introduction and popularization of cloud-based computing and storage services will continue to create a gray area of copyright
law.233 This confusion stems in part from the fact that when the Copyright
Act was introduced, it only contemplated physical mediums.234 Therefore,
in order to fully address the inadequacies of existing copyright law, Congress must revise the Copyright Act to include a digital first sale doctrine.235
Although amending the Copyright Act would be a lengthy and arduous
process, the legislatures have an excellent template to work from—section
117 of the Act.236
In the interim, the courts are also well equipped to address the legal dichotomies between digital and physical mediums.237 Common law copyright
exhaustion principles provide powerful tools for courts to use in restoring
the balance between copyright owners and purchasers of digital media content.238 By reducing copyright owner’s control over works once they enter
the stream of commerce, secondary markets in digital media would emerge,
230.
See Christman, supra note 57 (attributing the decline in digital music sales to
the increasing popularity of streaming music services).
231.
See generally Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.
N.Y. 2013); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 915 (2005); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 444 (1984) for a comprehensive history
of Internet piracy.
232.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 943 (explaining DRM technology and
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA).
233.
See Kiker, supra note 41, at 288-89.
234.
See Abelson, supra note 146, at 29.
235.
See supra Part III (B).
236.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).
237.
See Perzanowski et al., supra note 27, at 892.
238.
See id.
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increasing competition and reducing monopolization and consumer lockin.239 Additionally, using common law copyright exhaustion principles
would provide courts with a more straightforward and succinct process for
analyzing copyright infringement claims in the context of digital media.240

239.
240.

See id. at 907.
See id.

